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Respondent expressly concedes that there is a
circuit conflict regarding the first question presented,
and does not dispute the existence of such a conflict
regarding the second question. The brief in opposition
argues that, even if this Court were to conclude that the
Fifth Circuit erred on both issues, respondent would
ultimately prevail on other grounds not yet decided by
the court of appeals.~ But the other grounds raised by
respondent are matters that would be addressed in the
first instance by the court of appeals on remand, and
are no bar to review by this Court of the issues that
were decided by the Fifth Circuit below.2
I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO
DECIDE WHETHER A PLAINTIFF
CLAIMING DISCRIMINATORY
TERMINATION MUST PROVE THAT HE OR
SHE WAS REPLACED BY A PERSON
OUTSIDE HIS OR HER PROTECTED GROUP
Respondent candidly concedes that "there is a split
among the circuits relating to the elements of aprima
facie case applied to Title VII wrongful termination
cases .... " Br.Opp. 15. The brief in opposition
describes the same circuit court alignment set out in
the petition. Compare Br.Opp. 15 with Pet. 9-17.
Respondent contends that "the test applied by the
1 Br.Opp. 23 ("The granting of the petition for certiorari will
not change the outcome of this case.")(capitalization omitted).
2

Respondent asserts that if this Court were to grant certiorari
to decide the questions presented, it "would be forced" to address
(and resolve in its favor) these other contentions. Br.Opp. 12. It
is not this Court’s practice to address issues that were not decided
by the court below.

2
Fifth, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits [is]
correct .... " Br.Opp. 15. Respondent agrees that the
standard applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case was
established by long-standing Fifth Circuit precedent.
Br.Opp. 10, 16.
Respondent acknowledges that in this case the
court of appeals rejected Lavigne’s discrimination claim
because it "determin[ed] that [Lavigne] failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
termination[ ]." Br.Opp. i. The Fifth Circuit decision
in this case rested solely on its conclusion that Lavigne
had failed to establish a prima facie case because he
could not prove that he had been "replaced by someone
outside his protected group." Pet.App. 15a (quoting
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551,556 (5th Cir.
2007)). 3 Under the decision below, applying decades of
Fifth Circuit precedent, replacement by an individual
outside the protected group is one of the four essential
elements that "a plaintiff must show" in order to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Pet.App.
15a. Respondent itself insists that whether a plaintiff
was replaced by someone outside of his protected group
3 Respondent "suggests" that the district court applied, not the
Fifth Circuit standard, but the very different standard adopted by
a majority of the other circuits. Br.Opp. 17-18. But the court of
appeals in this case clearly applied the Fifth Circuit’s own
standard. Pet.App. 15a-16a. Respondent urges the Court to
resolve the question presented in "a case that only applied the test
of which Petitioner complains." Br.Opp. 18. But in this case the
Fifth Circuit "only applied" the replacement test, and it is the
standard applied by the court of appeals that matters.

3
"goes to the heart of the claim[ ]." Br.Opp. 16.4 Indeed,
respondent contends that the Fifth Circuit was required
by this Court’s decisions to impose that very
replacement requirement. Br.Opp. 14-15.5
Respondent contends that, even if this Court were
to reject the Fifth Circuit replacement requirement and
hold that Lavigne had established a prima facie case,
plaintifi’s claim would still fail because he has
insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination.
Br.Opp. 13, 23-24.6 But the court of appeals below
never reached that issue, and instead rejected Lavigne’s
claim solely because it concluded that he had not
established a prima facie case. Respondent does not
deny that the Fifth Circuit decision rested solely on the
asserted lack of a prima facie case; respondent merely
4

In one passage respondent characterizes this factor as merely
"relevant" to whether there is a prima facie case. Br.Opp. 16. But
in the instant case, and in all of the 34 Fifth Circuit decisions
quoted in the petition, Pet. App. 66a-72a, that factor is clearly a
distinct and necessary element of a prima facie case, in the absence
of which a claim will fail regardless of any other evidence.
~ Respondent asserts that in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506 (1993), this Court held that a prima facie case of
discriminatory termination requires proof that the plaintiff’s
position "was ultimately filled by someone outside his protected
class." Br.Opp. 14-15.
~ In a number of passages, the brief in opposition suggests that
Lavigne’s discriminatory termination claim was actually tried.
Br.Opp. 10, 12. But, as respondent elsewhere makes clear, that
claim was actually dismissed at summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case.
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contends that at some point in the future it would be
entitled to prevail on this other ground. Respondent’s
alternative argument was never addressed by the court
of appeals, and can be raised on remand. This Court
routinely grants review of cases in this posture.7
The brief in opposition points to evidence which
respondent claims supports its contention that
Lavigne’s dismissal was not the result of intentional
discrimination. Br.Opp. 2-6, 11-12. But those very
arguments highlight the importance of the question
presented,s Under the Fifth Circuit standard, a court
dismisses a case for want of a prima facie case without
having to consider whether the evidence in the case
7

Respondent suggests that the Court "wait" for a case in which
a defendant asserted the plaintiff lacked a prima facie case, but did
not contend (as does respondent) that the plaintifflacked sufficient
evidence of unlawful motive to survive summary judgment.
Br.Opp. 12. There are no such cases; in practice, defendants which
challenge the existence of a prima facie case always argue as well
that the plaintiffs lack such evidence. No sensible defendant would
concede that a reasonable jury could find unlawful discrimination,
and argue only that there was no prima facie case.
s

Respondent suggests that whether a plaintiff established a
prima facie case should be irrelevant once, as occurred here, a
defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed
action. Br. Opp. 13 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). But the Fifth Circuit does
require a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in those
circumstances. Pet.App. 15a, 66a-72a; see Hague v. University of
Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, 560 Fed.Appx. 328,
334-35 (5th Cir. 2014); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Paske v.
Fitzgerald, No. 15-162, 2015 WL 4651685.

would support or even compel a finding of invidious
discrimination. Thus in the instant case, the court of
appeals never addressed the conflicting evidence offered
by the parties. Respondent insists it fired Lavigne in
part because he "concealed" his driving record (Br.Opp.
4); Lavigne, on the other hand, swore that he had
disclosed the relevant information to his supervisors.
Pet. 3. Lavigne asserts that his supervisors had made
a number of discriminatory remarks, and that he
reported this to management (id.); respondent insists
that it has no written record of such an internal
complaint. Br.Opp. 5. The court of appeals never
discussed those conflicting accounts, because under the
controlling Fifth Circuit standard, in the absence of a
prima facie case, it is irrelevant whether respondent’s
justification for the dismissal was a palpable fabrication.
As the circumstances of this case make clear, the
Fifth Circuit replacement requirement is not merely a
procedural detail; that requirement effectively defines,
and sharply narrows, the protections of Title VII. An
employer which fires a worker on the basis of race,
national origin, gender or religion can immunize itself
from liability simply by hiring a replacement of the
"right" race, national origin, gender or religion. Any
employer of ordinary ingenuity could resort to that
tactic if it suspected that a dismissed employee was
going to file a discrimination suit. And that is precisely
the posture of this case. Respondent knew that in the
past Lavigne had complained to his supervisors about
discrimination (Pet. 3), and it hired a black replacement
for Lavigne shortly after Lavigne first contacted EEOC.
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II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO
DECIDE WHETHER A TITLE VI~ CHARGE
MUST IDENTIFY ALL OF AN EMPLOYER’S
UNLAWFUL MOTIVES
Respondent does not actually dispute the existence
of a circuit conflict regarding whether a Title VII charge
must identify all of an employer’s unlawful motives.
The brief in opposition describes the same Fifth,
Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions imposing that
requirement that are set out in the petition. Compare
Br.Opp. 18-19 with Pet. 22-24. Respondent does not
deny that the contrary rule is applied in the First,
Third, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. Pet. 25-28. And
respondent does not disagree that in the Third, Fourth
and Ninth Circuits, a lawsuit may include any type of
violation that was actually investigated by the EEOC,
even if it had never been raised in the original or any
amended administrative charge. Pet. 27-30.9 The brief
in opposition, having described the rule in the Fifth,
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, simply fails to address the
standard in the remaining circuits.
Respondent does not deny that the court of appeals
in this case dismissed Lavigne’s retaliation claim on the
ground that retaliation and discrimination are different
9 In the court below, respondents conceded that the EEOC’s
Houston office had investigated Lavigne’s termination and
retaliation claims. Pet.App. 24a. The brief in opposition objects
that there was no EEOC investigation of these claims. Br.Opp. 7.
But this assertion concerns the inaction of the EEOC New Orleans
office which, as we explained, did not conduct any investigation at
all. Pet. 4.

"legal theor[ies]." Pet. App. 17a. To the contrary, the
brief in opposition describes the same Fifth Circuit
precedent establishing that rule that is summarized in
the Petition. Compare Br.Opp. 18-19 with Pet. 22-23.
The primary argument advanced by respondent is
that the courts below should never have considered
Lavigne’s termination claim at all, because that
termination claim--specifically asserted in the amended
charge--was not related to the particular discriminatory
acts set out in the original charge. Br. Opp. 21-23. But
the district court expressly rejected that objection to
consideration of the Lavigne’s termination claim. Pet.
App. 37a-38a.1° The court of appeals did not disturb
10

The district court concluded that the termination claim was
related to the original administrative charge because respondent
had justified dismissing Lavigne on the ground that he was on
probation at the time that the company discovered his alleged
concealment of his driving record, and the original charge had
asserted that the probation itself was the result of discrimination.
Pet.App. 38a. The trial court also reasoned that the inclusion in
the original charge of a general allegation of discrimination was
sufficient to encompass the termination claim. Id.
At page 22 of the brief in opposition, respondent insists that
Lavigne’s termination claim was not "relate[d] in any way" to the
specific events referenced in the original charge. See id.
(termination claim is "unrelated to the prior events"). But at pp.
4-5 of the brief in opposition, respondent justified the dismissal of
Lavigne on the ground that he was on probation when the driving
record issue arose, the very disputed probation complained about
in the original charge. And at p. 1, the brief in opposition describes
the claims that were actually tried--the accident-disciplineprobation and wage claims that were set out in the original

that portion of the district court opinion, and
respondent has not sought review of that action by the
appellate court. At most this is an issue that
respondent might11 be able to raise on remand if this
Court were to reject the Fifth Circuit rule.
The merits arguments advanced in the brief in
opposition highlight the importance of this question to
the administration of Title VII and other statutes by
the EEOC. Respondent objects to the wording of the
amendment (Br.Opp. 21), and to the seven month delay
between the original and amended charge (Br.Opp. 7);
but it was the EEOC which drafted that amendment,
and it was the failure of the EEOC’s New Orleans office
to act on the original charge that resulted in the delay.
Pet. 4. These arguments would penalize a charging
party for the manner in which the Commission handled
his or her charge. Respondent argues that the absence
in a charge of a check mark on any box (indicating a
particular type of unlawful motive) should be deemed a
denial by the charging party that that type of unlawful
motive was present. Br. Opp. 7; see Br.Opp. 8 (claim of
retaliation "contradicted" by failure to check retaliation
box in original charge). But it is the EEOC itself that
charge~as "include[ing] facts relating to [Lavigne’s] previously
dismissed.., termination and retaliation claims."
11

Respondent could not pursue this issue on remand if this
Court were to adopt the standard in the Third, Fourth and Ninth
Circuits, which permit a plaintiff to file suit about any claim that
was in fact investigated by the EEOC. Pet. 28-30. Respondent
conceded below that in this case the EEOC did investigate
Lavigne’s retaliatory termination claim. Pet.App. 24a.

fills out these forms (Pet. 4), and interpreting in this
way the absence of a checked box could force the EEOC
to rewrite its forms. The EEOC understandably objects
that the "new legal theory" rule seriously interferes
with the Commission’s ability to administer Title VII
and other statutes. Pet. 33-34.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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